Abstract. The standard approach for constructing a large-stretch pseudorandom generator given a one-way permutation or given a smaller-stretch pseudo-random generator involves repeatedly composing the given primitive with itself. In this paper, we consider whether this approach is necessary, that is, whether there are constructions that do not involve composition. More formally, we consider black-box constructions of pseudorandom generators from pseudo-random generators of smaller stretch or from one-way permutations, where the constructions make only nonadaptive queries to the given object. We consider three classes of such constructions, and for each class, we give a black-box impossibility result that demonstrates a contrast between the stretch that can be achieved by adaptive and non-adaptive black-box constructions. We first consider constructions that make constantly-many non-adaptive queries to a given pseudo-random generator, where the seed length of the construction is at most O(log n) bits longer than the length n of each oracle query. We show that such constructions cannot achieve stretch that is even a single bit greater than the stretch of the given pseudorandom generator. We then consider constructions with arbitrarily long seeds, but where oracle queries are collectively chosen in a manner that depends only on a portion of the seed whose length is at most O(log n) bits longer than the length n of each query. We show that such constructions making constantly-many non-adaptive queries cannot achieve stretch that is ω(log n) bits greater than the stretch of the given pseudo-random generator. Finally, we consider a class of constructions motivated by streaming computation. Specifically, we consider constructions where the computation of each individual output bit depends only on the seed and on the response to a single query to a one-way permutation. We allow the seed to have a public portion that is arbitrarily long but must always be included in the output, and a non-public portion that is at most O(log n) ©IACR bits longer than the length n of each oracle query. We show that such constructions whose queries are chosen non-adaptively based only on the non-public portion of the seed cannot achieve linear stretch.
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bits longer than the length n of each oracle query. We show that such constructions whose queries are chosen non-adaptively based only on the non-public portion of the seed cannot achieve linear stretch.
Introduction
It is well known that if there exist pseudo-random generators obtaining even one bit of stretch, then for every polynomial p(n), there exist pseudo-random generators obtaining p(n) bits of stretch. The usual approach for constructing a pseudo-random generator of large stretch from a pseudo-random generator of smaller stretch involves composing the smaller-stretch generator with itself repeatedly. Similarly, the usual approach for constructing a pseudo-random generators of large stretch from a one-way permutation involves composing the one-way permutation with itself repeatedly.
In this paper, we consider whether there exist such constructions that do not involve composition. To formalize this requirement about composition, we consider constructions that only have oracle access to the given object (a smallerstretch pseudo-random generator or a one-way permutation) and query this oracle non-adaptively. We refer to such constructions as non-adaptive (oracle) constructions.
Given oracle access to a pseudo-random generator or a one-way permutation is it possible to construct, via non-adaptive oracle queries, a pseudo-random generator of large stretch?
We give a number of black-box impossibility results for non-adaptive oracle constructions of pseudo-random generators. Some of these arguments are rather technically involved. Roughly speaking, we answer in the negative whether we can obtain, with only a constant number of queries to a pseudo-random generator, a pseudo-random generator of much larger stretch, where answers to these non-adaptive queries are combined arbitrarily. The challenge is to deal with this arbitrary computation phase.
Non-adaptive constructions are conceptually related to streaming cryptography; that is, computing private-key primitives with a device that uses small space and accesses the seed a small number of times. One of the three non-adaptive settings we consider in this paper is motivated by questions in streaming cryptography.
Our results. Observe that if pseudo-random generators exist, then there exist trivial non-adaptive oracle constructions of large-stretch pseudo-random generators: such constructions can simply ignore their oracle and directly compute a large-stretch pseudo-random generator. Since we are interested in constructions that use their oracle in a non-trivial way, we focus on constructions whose pseudo-randomness is proven using a black-box reduction [8] to the the security (pseudo-randomness or one-wayness) of their oracle.
We consider three classes of such constructions, and give bounds on the stretch that can be obtained by each class. For each class, our results demonstrate a contrast between the stretch that can be achieved by adaptive and non-adaptive constructions. We show that, in some sense, whatever was already known regarding algorithms for non-adaptive constructions is the best we can hope for. While we are primarily interested in constructions that are polynomialtime computable, our bounds hold even for computationally-unbounded constructions (where the number of oracle queries is still bounded).
-Class 1: Constructions with short seeds Suppose we have a pseudo-random generator f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n+s(n) and we wish to obtain a pseudo-random generator with larger stretch, say stretch 2·s(n). We can easily define such a generator G f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n+2·s(n) as follows: on input x ∈ {0, 1} n , G f computes y 0 ||y 1 = f (x) (where |y 0 | = s(n) and |y 1 | = n), and outputs y 0 ||f (y 1 ). G f can be formalized as a fully blackbox construction making two adaptive oracle queries, each of the same length as G's seed x, to an oracle mapping n bits to n + s(n) bits. This idea can easily be extended to obtain, for every k ∈ N, a fully black-box construction making k adaptive oracle queries and achieving stretch k · s(n).
We show that fully black-box constructions making constantly-many queries, each of the same length as their seed length n, must make adaptive queries even to achieve stretch s(n) + 1, that is, even to achieve a one-bit increase in stretch. We show that this also holds for constructions whose seed length is at most O(log n) bits longer than the length n of each oracle query.
-Class 2: Constructions with long seeds
What about constructions whose seed length is significantly longer than the length of each oracle query? Can we also show that such constructions must make adaptive oracle queries in order to achieve greater stretch than their oracle? In fact, a very simple way for such a construction to make nonadaptive oracle queries, yet achieve greater stretch than its oracle, involves splitting up its seed into two or more portions, and using each portion as an oracle query. For example, if f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n+1 is pseudo-random, then the generator
is also pseudo-random. Observe that when this construction is given an input chosen uniformly at random, the oracle queries x 1 and x 2 are chosen independently (and uniformly at random); this property is crucial for the construction's security.
What about constructions where oracle queries cannot be chosen independently and uniformly at random? Specifically, what if we consider constructions where we place no restriction on the seed length, but insist that oracle queries are collectively chosen in a manner that depends only on a portion of the seed that is not too much longer than the length of each oracle query (making it impossible to simply split up the seed into multiple queries)? While this setting may seem unnatural at first, it is possible in this setting to obtain a construction that makes constantly-many nonadaptive oracle queries to a pseudo-random generator and achieves more stretch than its oracle; indeed, even a single query suffices. For example, if
n → {0, 1} n+s(n) is pseudo-random, then by the Goldreich-Levin theorem [6] we have that for all functions m(n) ∈ O(log n), the number generator G f : {0, 1} n·m(n)+n → {0, 1} n·m(n)+n+s(n)+m(n) defined for all r 1 , r 2 , . . . , r m(n) , x ∈ {0, 1} n as
is pseudo-random; the stretch of G f is m(n) bits greater than the stretch of f . Also observe that the query made by G (·) depends only on a portion of the seed of G (·) whose length is the same as the length of the query (indeed, the query is identical to this portion of the seed). Using this Goldreich-Levinbased approach, it is easy to see that adaptive black-box constructions whose input length is much longer than the length n of each oracle query can obtain stretch k · s(n) + O(log n) by making k queries to an oracle of stretch s(n), even when the portion of the seed that is used to choose oracle queries has length n.
We show that fully black-box constructions G (·) making constantly-many queries of length n to a pseudo-random generator f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n+s(n) , such that only the rightmost n + O(log n) bits of the seed of G (·) are used to choose oracle queries, must make adaptive queries in order to achieve stretch s(n) + ω(log n). That is, such constructions making constantly-many nonadaptive queries cannot achieve greater stretch than the stretch provided by Goldreich-Levin with just a single query. This holds no matter how long a seed is used by the construction G (·) .
-Class 3: Goldreich-Levin-like constructions The final class of constructions we consider is motivated by the streaming computation of pseudo-random generators. What is the relationship between non-adaptivity and streaming? In what sense could one prove a black-box lower bound that rules out streaming constructions of pseudo-random generator G of linear stretch using a one-way permutation π? A black-box lowerbound stated for a streaming device has to reference the many details of the model. We wish to state a similar thing in a setting that abstracts out a common property of streaming algorithms extended to have oracle access to a one-way permutation. Can a streaming algorithm be adaptive (even when we do not account for the space occupied by the oracle tape), in the sense that a query depends on many bits of previous queries? Given that a random input is incompressible, and the fact that we lack space (so as to store) and passes over the input (so as to recompute), it is plausible to consider non-adaptivity as a clean setting for studying black-box streaming constructions.
We consider a class of constructions where the seed has a public portion that is always included in the output, the choice of each oracle query does not depend on the public portion of the seed, and the computation of each individual output bit depends only on the seed and on the response to a single oracle query. We refer to such constructions making non-adaptive oracle queries as bitwise-nonadaptive constructions. It is not hard to see that such constructions making polynomially-many adaptive queries to a one-way permutation π : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n can achieve arbitrary polynomial stretch; the idea is to repeatedly compose π with itself, outputting a hardcore bit of π on each composition. For example, using the Goldreich-Levin hardcore bit [6] , a standard way of constructing a pseudo-random generator G of polynomial stretch p(n) is the following: On input r, x ∈ {0, 1} n ,
where
, and α, β denotes the standard inner product of α and β. Observe that the leftmost n bits of the seed of G are public in the sense that they are included in the output. Also observe that each of the remaining output bits of G is computed using only a single output of π along with the input bits of G. Finally, observe that the queries made to π do not depend on the public input bits of G, and the number of nonpublic input bits is no greater than the length n of each oracle query. It is natural to ask whether the adaptive use of π in a construction of this form is necessary. This is particularly interesting if we wish to compute G in a streaming setting where we have small workspace, we are allowed to produce the output bit-by-bit, and we are allowed to re-read the input once per output bit. We show that fully black-box bitwise-nonadaptive constructions G (·) making queries of length n to a one-way permutation, such that the non-public portion of the seed of G (·) is of length at most n + O(log n), cannot achieve linear stretch. This holds no matter the length of the public portion of the seed of G (·) .
We conclude this paper with some remarks and observations about streaming models for cryptography. Our treatment of streaming models mostly serves the purpose of proposing some new research directions.
Related work. Black-box reductions were formalized by Impagliazzo and Rudich [8] , who observed that most proofs of security in cryptography are of this form. Impagliazzo and Rudich also gave the first black-box impossibility results. In their most general form, such results show that for particular security properties P 1 and P 2 , it is impossible to give a black-box construction of P 1 from P 2 . The same approach can also be applied to particular classes of black-box constructions, such as those making some restricted number of oracle queries or those that query their oracle non-adaptively. A large number of impossibility results have been given using this framework. The results most closely related to the problem we are considering are those of Gennaro et al [5] , Viola [13] , Lu [10] , and Miles and Viola [11] .
Gennnaro et al [5] consider black-box constructions of pseudo-random generators from one-way permutations. They show that such constructions cannot achieve ω(log n) bits of stretch per oracle query of length n, even when queries are chosen adaptively. Their result can be extended in a straightforward way to show that for the second class of constructions we consider (and also for a more general class where queries are allowed to depend on the entire seed), for every k ∈ N, constructions making k oracle queries to a pseudo-random generator of stretch s(n) cannot achieve stretch k·s(n)+ω(log n), even when these queries are chosen adaptively. By contrast, recall that we show that for this class of constructions, for every k ∈ N, constructions making k non-adaptive oracle queries to a pseudo-random generator of stretch s(n) cannot achieve stretch s(n) + ω(log n).
Viola [13] considers black-box constructions of pseudo-random generators from one-way functions where oracle queries are non-adaptive but chosen in a computationally unbounded way, while the output of the construction is computed from the query responses by an AC 0 (polynomial-size and constant-depth) circuit. He shows that such constructions cannot achieve linear stretch. The class of constructions considered by Viola is, in general, incomparable to the classes we consider. His class is more general in terms of the numbers of queries allowed and the way that queries are chosen: he places no bounds on the number of queries, allows the queries to be chosen arbitrarily based on the seed (while we require queries to be chosen in a computable manner), and places no restrictions on the length of the queries relative to the length of the seed. On the other hand, his class is more restrictive in terms of the computational power allowed after the query responses are received: he only allows AC 0 computation, while we allow unbounded computation.
Lu [10] considers the same class of constructions as Viola, except that Lu allows the output to be computed from the query responses by a subexponentialsize constant-depth circuit (rather than an AC 0 circuit). He shows that such constructions cannot achieve linear stretch.
Miles and Viola [11] consider black-box constructions of pseudo-random generators from pseudo-random generators of 1-bit stretch, where the oracle queries are non-adaptive but chosen in a computationally unbounded way, while the output of the construction consists simply of query response bits; that is, these constructions are not allowed to perform any computation on query responses. They show that such constructions cannot achieve linear stretch. Like the constructions considered by Viola [13] and Lu [10] , the class of constructions considered by Miles and Viola is, in general, incomparable to the classes we consider: the constructions they consider are more general in the manner in which queries are chosen (they place no restrictions on the length of queries relative to the length of the seed), but much more restrictive in terms of the computational power allowed after query responses are received.
In the positive direction, Haitner et al [7] give the first non-adaptive blackbox construction of a pseudo-random generator from a one-way function. Their construction achieves sublinear stretch. They also give a non-adaptive black-box construction achieving linear stretch, but this requires an exponentially-hard oneway function. In both of these constructions, the oracle queries are collectively chosen based on a portion of the seed that is significantly longer than the length of each oracle query. By contrast, recall that all of our impossibility results are for constructions where the oracle queries are collectively chosen based on a portion of the seed that is no more than logarithmically-many bits longer than the length of each oracle query.
Organization. Section 2 contains definitions and preliminaries. The impossibility results for constructions with short seeds and long seeds are discussed in Sections 3 and 4 respectively. In Section 5, we state a restriction on the way that constructions choose oracle queries, and under this restriction we extend the results of Sections 3 and 4 to constructions making polynomially-many queries. The impossibility result for Goldreich-Levin-like constructions is found in Section 6. Section 7 contains our remarks on streaming models in cryptography.
Preliminaries
Notation. We use "PPT" to denote "probabilistic polynomial time". We denote by a n the n-bit binary string representation of a ∈ N, padded with leading zeros when necessary. If the desired representation length is clear from the context, we write a instead of a n . If a ≥ 2 n , then a n denotes the n least significant bits of the binary representation of a. We denote by x||y the concatenation of strings x and y.
Pseudo-random generators and one-way functions
A length-increasing function G : {0, 1} 1(n) → {0, 1} 2(n) is a pseudo-random generator if for every PPT adversary M , we have Pr
for all c and sufficiently large n. A function f : {0, 1} 1(n) → {0, 1} 2(n) is one-way if for every PPT adversary M , we have Pr
c for all c and sufficiently large n.
Non-adaptive constructions
Our impossibility results are for constructions that use their oracle in a nonadaptive manner. We will sometimes need to refer to the querying function of a non-adaptive oracle machine. Definition 2. (Querying function) Let 1 (n), 2 (n), and p(n) be polynomials, and let M (·) : {0, 1} 1(n) → {0, 1} 2(n) be a non-adaptive oracle machine that makes p(n) oracle queries, each of length n. The querying function of M (·) , denoted Q M , is the function Q M : {0, 1} 1(n) × {0, 1} log p(n) → {0, 1} n such that for all x ∈ {0, 1} 1(n) and 0 ≤ i < p(n), the i-th oracle query made by
is Q M (x, i). When p(n) ≡ 1, the second argument to Q M is omitted.
If there exists a polynomial r(n) such that the queries made by M (·) depend only on the rightmost r(n) bits of the input of M (·) , then the r(n)-restricted
log p(n) → {0, 1} n such that for all v ∈ {0, 1} 1(n)−r(n) , w ∈ {0, 1} r(n) , and 0 ≤ i < p(n), the i-th oracle query made by
Black-box reductions
Reingold, Trevisan, and Vadhan [12] give a classification of black-box security reductions. Our impossibility results apply to what Reingold et al call fully-black box reductions. We avoid defining such reductions in their full generality and instead focus on security reductions for constructions of pseudo-random number generators from pseudo-random generators of smaller stretch.
Definition 3. (Fully black-box reduction
be a number generator whose construction has access to an oracle for a lengthincreasing function mapping 1 (n) bits to 2 (n) bits. There is a fully black-box reduction of the pseudo-randomness of G (·) to the pseudo-randomness of its oracle if there exists a PPT oracle machine M (·,·) such that for every function
2 (n) and every function A : {0, 1} 2(n) → {0, 1}, if A breaks the pseudo-randomness of G f then M (f,A) breaks the pseudo-randomness of f . Definition 3 can be modified in a straightforward way for constructions of pseudorandom number generators from other primitives, such as from one-way permutations. An oracle construction whose security is proven using a black-box reduction is called a black-box construction.
Constructions with short seeds
In this section, we consider constructions whose seed length is not more than O(log n) bits longer than the length n of each oracle query. Recall that such constructions making k adaptive queries to a given pseudo-random generator can achieve stretch that is k times the stretch of the given generator. We show that such constructions making constantly-many non-adaptive queries cannot achieve stretch that is even a single bit longer than the stretch of the given generator. Theorem 1. Let k ∈ N, and let 1 (n) and 2 (n) be polynomials such that
be a non-adaptive oracle construction of a number generator, making k queries of length n to an oracle mapping n bits to 2 (n) bits. Then there is no fully black-box reduction of the pseudo-randomness of G (·) to the pseudo-randomness of its oracle.
The approach we use to prove Theorem 1 does not seem to extend to the case of polynomially-many (or even ω(1)-many) queries. However, a similar approach does work for polynomially-many queries when we place a restriction on the many-oneness of the number generator's querying function. We state this restriction in Section 5.
We give an overview of the proof of Theorem 1 in Section 3.1, and we give the proof details in the full version of this paper.
Proof overview for Theorem 1
A simpler case We first consider the simpler case of constructions making just a single query, where the query made is required to be the same as the construction's input. That is, we consider constructions
such that on every input x ∈ {0, 1} n , G makes query x to an oracle mapping n bits to 2 (n) bits. Fix such a construction G (·) . We need to show the existence of functions f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} 2(n) and A : {0, 1} 2(n) → {0, 1} such that A breaks the pseudo-randomness of G f but f is pseudo-random even with respect to adversaries that have oracle access to f and A. Following the approach for proving black-box impossibility results initiated by Impagliazzo and Rudich [8] , we actually define a joint distribution (F, A) over pairs of functions, such that with probability one over (f, A) ← (F, A), A breaks the pseudo-randomness of G f but f is pseudo-random even with respect to adversaries that have oracle access to f and A.
Consider how we might define such a joint distribution (F, A). The most obvious approach is to let (F, A) be the distribution defined by the following procedure for sampling a tuple (f, A) ← (F, A): randomly select f from the (infinite) set of all functions that, for each n ∈ N, map n bits to 2 (n) bits; let A be the function such that for every z ∈ {0, 1} 2(n)+1 , A(z) = 1 if and only if there exists an s ∈ {0, 1} n such that G f (s) = z. Following this approach, we have that with probability one over (f, A) ← (F, A) , A breaks the pseudorandomness of G f but f is pseudo-random with respect to adversaries that have oracle access to f alone. However, it is not necessarily the case that f is pseudorandom with respect to adversaries that have oracle access to f and A. For example, suppose construction G is such that for every x ∈ {0, 1} n−1 and every b ∈ {0, 1}, G f (x||b) = f (x||b)||b. In this case, it is easy to use A to break f : on input y ∈ {0, 1} 2(n) , output 1 if and only if either A(y||0) = 1 or A(y||1) = 1. To overcome this problem, we add some "noise" to A. We need to be careful that we add enough noise to A so that it is no longer useful for breaking f , but we do not add so much noise that A no longer breaks G f . Our basic aproach is to modify A so that instead of only accepting G f (s) for all s ∈ {0, 1} n , A accepts G fi(s) for all s, all i, and some appropriate collection of functions {f 0 , f 1 , f 2 , . . . } where f 0 = f . How should this collection of functions be defined? Since we want to make sure that A still breaks G f , and since we have that A accepts G f (s) with probability 1 over s ← {0, 1} n , we need to ensure that A accepts randomly chosen strings with probability non-negligibly less than 1. For this, it suffices to ensure that (# of n-bit strings s)*(# of functions f i ) is at most, say, half the number of strings of length 2 (n) + 1. At the same time, to prevent A from helping to break f , we would like it to be the case that, intuitively, A treats strings that are not in the image of f on an equal footing with strings that are in the image of f . One way to accomplish these objectives, which we follow, is to randomly select a permutation π on {0, 1} 2(n) , define f (x) = π(0 2(n)−n ||x) for all x ∈ {0, 1} n , and define A to accept G π(y||·) (s) for every y ∈ {0, 1} 2(n)−n and every s ∈ {0, 1} n . We formalize this as a joint distribution (F, A, Π) over tuples (f, A, π) that are sampled in the manner just described.
It is easy to show that with probability one over (f, A, π) ← (F, A, Π), A does indeed break G f . It is much more difficult to show that with probability one over (f, A, π) ← (F, A, Π), f is pseudo-random ever with respect to PPT adversaries that have oracle access to f and A. We argue that it suffices to show that for every PPT oracle machine D (·,·) , the probability over (f, A, π) ← (F, A, Π) and
) makes oracle query s to f is negligible. Now, instead of only showing this for every PPT oracle machine D (·,·) , we find it more convenient to show this for every computationally unbounded probabilistic oracle machine D (·,·) that makes at most polynomially-many oracle queries. How might we do so? We would like to argue that A does not help D to find s since a computationally unbounded D can try to compute A by itself. More formally, we would like to show that given D, we can build a D that, given input f (s) and given oracle access only to f , simulates D on input f (s), answers f -queries of D using the given oracle, and "makes up" answers to the A-queries of D in a manner that ensures that the probability that the simulation of D makes query s is very close to the probability that D (f,A) (f (s)) makes oracle query s. Of course, D does not "know" π, so it is not immediately clear how it should answer the A-queries of the simulation of D. If D simply randomly chooses its own permutation π and answers A-queries using π in place of the unknown π, the simulation of D may "notice" this sleight of hand. For example, since D is given f (s) as input, it might (depending on the definition of G) be able to compute the value of G f (s), and hence make query G f (s) to A; if this query does not produce response 1, D will "know" that queries are not being responded to properly.
We address this by showing that D can still compute "most" of A on its own, and that the "rest" of A is not helpful for finding s. Specifically, we split A into two functions, A 1 and A 2 , that together can be used to compute A. Function A 1 outputs 1 only on input G f (s). For every ( 2 (n) + 1)-bit string z, A 2 (z) = 1 if and only if z = G f (s) and A(z) = 1. We then argue that querying A 1 provides very little help for finding s. Let X be the set of all strings x ∈ {0, 1} n such that
Roughly speaking, if X is large, then A 1 gives no information about s beyond the fact that s ∈ X. On the other hand, if X is small, then we argue it is unlikely that an adversary making polynomially-many queries to A 1 will receive a non-zero response to any of its queries (in other words, it is unlikely that query G f (s) will be made). It remains to argue that D can compute A 2 on its own. We show that if D randomly selects a permutation π , computes an A 2 based on π (rather than π), uses this A 2 along with the given A 1 to answer the A-queries of the simulation of D, and answers the f -queries of the simulation of D based on π (0 2(n)−n ||·) (rather than using the given oracle f ), then it is unlikely that the simulation of D will make a query that "exposes" the fact that its oracle queries are not being answered by f and A.
The general case We extend the above argument to constructions
making constantly-many non-adaptive queries, where the length 1 (n) of the construction's input is allowed to be O(log n) bits longer than the length n of each oracle query. The high-level idea is the same: we define a joint distribution (F, A, Π) by specifying a procedure for sampling a tuple (f, A, π) ← (F, A, Π), and the way we sample π and f is (almost) the same as before. But now we change the way A behaves. Our goal is to follow the same style of argument as before. To accomplish this, we would still like it to be the case that when we "split up" A into functions A 1 and A 2 , there is still at most one string accepted by A 1 (this helps us ensure that A 1 does not provide too much information about s). Recall that before, when D was run on an input f (s), the unique string accepted by A 1 was G f (s). This made sense because in the previous setting, the only input on which G (·) made oracle query s was s itself. But in the current setting, for each s ∈ {0, 1} n , there may be many inputs x ∈ {0, 1} 1(n) on which G (·) makes oracle query s. We would like to modify the definition of A so that rather than accepting G π(y||·) (x) for every y ∈ {0, 1} 2(n)−n and every x ∈ {0, 1} 1(n) , A accepts G π(y||·) (x) for every y ∈ {0, 1} 2(n)−n and x in some subset Good(n) ⊆ {0, 1} 1(n) such that for every s ∈ {0, 1} n , there is at most one x ∈ Good(n) such that G (·) on input x makes query s. But we cannot do exactly this (and still have that A breaks G f ), since, for example, there might be some string t that G (·) queries no matter what its input is.
Instead, we need to proceed very carefully, partitioning the set of strings t of length n into those that are queried by G (·) for "many" of its inputs x ∈ {0, 1} 1(n) , and those queried by G (·) for "at most a few" of its inputs x ∈ {0, 1} 1(n) . We call the former set F ixed(n) and the latter set NotF ixed(n). We then define a set Good(n) ⊆ {0, 1} 1(n) of inputs to G (·) such that for no pair of distinct inputs from Good(n) does G (·) make the same query t ∈ NotF ixed(n). That is, each t ∈ NotF ixed(n) is queried by G (·) for at most one of its inputs
x ∈ Good(n). The challenge, of course, is ensuring that that the set Good(n) defined this way is "large enough". We define A to accept G π(y||·) (x) for every y ∈ {0, 1} 2(n)−n and every x ∈ Good(n). Now we can "split up" A into A 1 and A 2 in a manner similar to what we did before: on input f (s) to D , where s ∈ NotF ixed(n), if there exists a string x ∈ Good(n) such that G (·) (x) makes query s (note that there can be at most one such string x by definition of Good(n)), then A 1 only accepts G f (x), and if there is no such string x then A 1 does not accept any strings; as before, we define A 2 to accept the remaining strings accepted by A. We then argue as before about the (lack of) usefulness of A 1 and A 2 for helping to find s. Finally, we argue that our definition of F ixed(n) ensures that this set will be of negligible size, and hence it does not hurt to ignore the case s ∈ F ixed(n) (since this case will occur with negligible probability).
Constructions with long seeds
In Section 3, we saw that black-box constructions G (·) making constantly-many non-adaptive oracle queries, where the seed length of G (·) is not too much longer than the length of each oracle query, cannot achieve even a single bit more stretch than their oracle. In this section, we consider constructions whose seed length is allowed to be much longer than the length of each oracle query, but where the oracle queries are collectively chosen in a manner that depends only on a portion of the seed whose length is not more than O(log n) bits longer than the length n of each oracle query. Recall that such constructions making even a single query to a given pseudo-random generator can achieve stretch that is O(log n) bits longer than the stretch of the given generator [6] . Further, recall that such constructions making k adaptive queries can achieve stretch that is O(log n) bits longer than k times the stretch of the given generator. We show that such constructions making constantly-many non-adaptive queries cannot achieve stretch that is ω(log n) bits longer than the stretch of the given generator. Theorem 2. Let k ∈ N, c ∈ R + , and m(n) ∈ ω(log n). Let 0 (n), 1 (n), and 2 (n) be polynomials such that 1 (n) ≤ n + c log n. Let G (·) : {0, 1} 0(n)+1(n) → {0, 1} 0(n)+1(n)+(2(n)−n)+m(n) be a non-adaptive oracle construction of a number generator that makes k queries of length n to a number generator mapping n bits to 2 (n) bits, such that for all r ∈ {0, 1} 0(n) and x ∈ {0, 1} 1(n) , the queries made by G (·) on input (r||x) depend only on x. Then there is no fully black-box reduction of the pseudo-randomness of G (·) to the pseudo-randomness of its oracle.
As is the case for Theorem 1, the approach we use to prove Theorem 2 does not seem to extend to the case of polynomially-many (or even ω(1)-many) queries. However, a similar approach does work for polynomially-many queries when we place a restriction on the many-oneness of the number generator's querying function. We state this restriction in Section 5.
We give an overview of the proof of Theorem 2 in Section 4.1, and we give the proof details in the full version of this paper.
